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Abstract 
 
One of the main reasons for subsidising university research is the widespread belief that it 
generates proportionally more positive knowledge externalities than corporate research.  Over 
the last two decades, however, this belief has been shaken by the increasingly aggressive 
patenting of university-based innovation. .  This perception was supported by Henderson, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) who found both a sharp increase in university patenting and a 
decrease in the relative ‘importance’ of university innovation over the later part of their 1965-
1992 sample.   In this paper, we have compared the knowledge externalities generated by 
university and corporate patents related to GM crop research. Our main measure of 
knowledge externalities is the total number of third party cites generated by a patent. 
Our main result is that patented university research is not associated with greater knowledge 
externalities than corresponding corporate patents.  If anything, corporate patents appear to 
generate greater numbers of net citations.  This basic conclusion survives when we control for 
a number of variables that could affect citation counts (e.g. patent examiner effects) and when 
we break our sample into sub-periods. This does not imply that university patents are similar 
to corporate patents in every respect.  We find two main differences. Firstly, there is some 
evidence that the shape of the distribution of citations is not identical for the two groups of 
patents as university patents appear to experience a more sluggish start than their corporate 
brethren. Secondly, even controlling quite narrowly for areas of specialisation, university 
patents receive a disproportionate number of cites from other university patents.  These two 
results suggest that there are some fundamental differences in the types of knowledge flows 
generated by university and corporate patents. 
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 Economists have long been convinced that innovation is a crucial factor of 
economic growth.  This belief has only been reinforced by the emergence of new 
theories where growth is explicitly driven by R&D investments and the resulting 
flows of knowledge. 1 If growth depends on innovation, and growth is deemed to be 
desirable, then one should worry about the level of investment into innovative 
activities.  In particular, one would like to know whether private investment decisions 
are likely to lead to levels and types of innovation that are close to the social 
optimum.   
 
Not surprisingly, the theoretical literature is inconclusive.  To the extent that 
private inventors fail to capture the whole social surplus created by their efforts, 
innovation will be underprovided.  Moreover, if the ratio of social to private benefits 
varies across fields of research, the mix of inventions provided by the market will also 
be sub-optimal. On the other end, private provision of innovation might also be too 
high.  This is essentially a ‘excess entry’ phenomenon: individual inventors do not 
consider the fact that their own successful innovation might hurt the profits of their 
competitors.  This negative pecuniary externality – known as the ‘business stealing’ 
effect – leads to too much ‘duplication; of R&D effort 
 
In spite of the agnosticism of economic theory, policy-makers clearly believe 
that current levels of innovation are too low.  While public initiatives aimed and 
promoting the ‘knowledge-based economy’ flourish, it would be hard to find a single 
policy explicitly aimed at reducing the amount of resources devoted to innovation. 
University research has long been an important component of innovation policies.  
This is not only true in the US, where federal research grants account for a substantial 
proportion of the budget of leading universities but also in several European countries 
where university funding is increasingly linked to measures of research outputs.  State 
financing of university research is mostly justified by two types of arguments.  The 
first one refers to the complementarity between teaching and research, alleging that 
quality higher education can only be provided by individuals who are themselves at 
the forefront of their field.  The second argument is that university research is more 
‘basic’ than corporate research and, as such, involves greater benefits for society at 
large. 
                                                 
1 For a review of this literature, see Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
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Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) have pointed out that this notion of 
‘basicness’ is linked to at least three logically distinct ideas.  A first possible 
interpretation of ‘basic’ is that universities are, on average, involved in more path-
breaking research than the corporate sector.    One can also interpret ‘basic’ as 
‘fundamental’ or ‘important’: universities are more likely to create new fields that are 
subsequently developed by the private sectors.  As those fields – and the associated 
social benefits – would not have emerged (or at least not as fast) without university 
involvement, the total benefits associated with this ‘upstream’ research are larger than 
the benefits associated with the more applied ‘downstream’ research.  Finally the 
degree of ‘basicness’ of an innovation might also refer to its degree of appropriability: 
the more basic the research the lower the proportion of total surplus that can be 
secured by the inventor. 
 
These three aspects of ‘basicness’ might be logically distinct but, from a 
policy point of view, they are inextricably linked.  The reason why policy-makers care 
about ‘basic as path-breaking’ is because it is associated with ‘basic as important’.  
Moreover, the reason why policy-makers consider subsidising university research is 
that they believe that these two notions of ‘basicness’ are closely correlated with 
‘basicness as lack of appropriability’.  It is because university research is thought to 
be different, more important and less appropriable than corporate research that it 
receives special treatment from the State.  Until the late 1970s this line of argument 
was generally accepted.  As, by law, US universities could essentially not directly 
benefit from the commercialisation of their research, traditional academic career 
incentives were bound to bias university innovation towards the more ‘basic’ kind.  In 
fact, Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) exploited this prior belief  that 
university research was more basic to develop measures of the three aspects of 
‘basicness’ discussed above. 
 
In 1980, however, the Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to retain property 
rights on inventions that had benefited from federal funding.  The universities ‘ 
control over their intellectual property was further strengthened in 1984.  These legal 
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changes led to a huge increase in university patenting.2  As universities started selling 
the output of their research and emerged as potential rivals to the private sector, the 
validity of the traditional argument for supporting university research began to be 
questioned.   To address this concern, Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) 
examined whether the degree of ‘basicness’ of (patented) university research actually 
changed after the legislation of the early 1980s.  Using a random sample from all 
patents assigned to universities between 1965 and 1992, they found that, although the 
difference has declined over time, university patents were still more general (basic as 
breakthrough) and more important than the corresponding corporate patents. 
 
We revisit this issue with more recent data on GM crop patents.  Bio-
technology in general, and GM crop research in particular, is a poster child of the 
controversy surrounding university patenting.  Over the last fifteen years, biotech has 
seen a high proportion of university patents, university-corporation joint ventures and 
numerous researcher leaving the academic ranks to joint private companies or found 
their own.  If one is likely to find a strong convergence between university and 
corporate research universities in any field of research, biotech is a prominent 
candidate.  In other words, limiting ourselves to GM crop innovations provides a 
strong test of the convergence hypothesis: if it is rejected in this sample, it is quite 
likely to be rejected in most other research area.   
 
Using patent data for a well-defined research field has other advantages.  
Firstly it allows for better control of research area than the three-digit patent classes 
traditionally used in cross-sectional data sets.  Secondly, it makes it easier to identify 
the start of new innovation cycles. As citation patterns might vary along such cycles 
and universities might be more or less involved in different phases, this is potentially 
important.  GM crop innovations are especially convenient in this respect as we can 
examine patents from the very beginning of the field. Finally, public policy towards 
university research can be  – and is – tailored to specific research areas.  In particular, 
the government controls the allocation of federal funds and can decide whether or not 
biotechnology, or even GM crops, is a field of research that it cares to subsidise at the 
                                                 
2 See Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) 
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university level.  It is therefore useful to check whether the conclusions drawn from 
larger data sets are confirmed for more narrowly defined domains of innovation. 
 
Our main conclusion is that, over the period eleven year period from the 
beginning of 1988 to the end of 1998, university GM crop patents have not proved to 
be more important than corporate patents.  If anything, the evidence suggests that 
university patents might, on average, have generated fewer ‘knowledge externalities’ 
than their corporate equivalent.  This basic conclusion does not change when we 
consider the role of patent examiners and attorneys, when we control for precise areas 
of research or when we look at various sub-periods within the sample.   
 
Still, university and corporate patents are not identical. We find that the shape 
of the cite distributions for university and corporate patents might be different.  
University patents seem to need more time to start gathering citations.  As our citation 
data is censored, this difference in citation profiles would bias the estimate of the 
importance of university patents downwards.  However, correcting for this asymmetry 
does not suffice to reverse our basic conclusion.  University patents also receive cites 
disproportionately from other universities.  This effect remains significant even when 
we control for the precise area of research for which the patents are obtained, so that it 
cannot be explained by a common pattern of specialisation among universities.  This 
suggests that the explanation must be related to the flow of information between 
different types of agents: university researchers are simply more aware of the 
(patented !) work done by other universities.  Finally we find that, although university 
patents appear to rely more heavily on published scientific research than corporate 
patents, this effect disappears once one distinguishes between references to third party 
papers and references to papers (co-authored) by one of the inventors.  Hence 
university patents are complementary products of the inventors’ own academic 
research but they do not draw on the overall pool of ‘basic’ scientific knowledge more 
heavily than corporate patents. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 1 presents the data. The 
net citation patterns of university and corporate patents are compared in section 2, 
while section 3 explores further differences between the two types of patents. Section 
4 concludes. 
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1. Data 
 
We use US patent data obtained from the USPTO web site.  We focus on 
patented innovations about genetically modified crops. These are defined as 
inventions concerning the transformation of crop plants through genetic engineering 
techniques.  Our data set begins with the first GM crop patent, granted in 1988 and 
stops at the end of 1998. There are a total of 635 patents, 150 of which were obtained 
by universities. Given our extensive search process3, we are confident that we have 
information about nearly all of the relevant patents granted over this period of time. 
For each patent, we encoded the information routinely available from the USPTO site: 
date of filing, date of grant, assignee, main patent classes, number of claims, number 
of US and foreign patents cited, number of scientific articles cited, number of 
citations obtained from subsequent patents, name of the primary patent examiner and 
name of the attorney or agent shepherding the patent application through the USPTO 
approval process.  In the current version of the paper, the number of citations received 
by each patent is counted as of February 2003.  This means that, for the last patent in 
our data set, more than four years have elapsed between their date of grant and the last 
possible date of citation.  
 
This standard set of information was enlarged in several directions.  For each 
patent, the identity of the citing patents was established.  This enabled us to identify 
own citations, citations coming from distinct fields of invention and citations made by 
patents held by universities. We also counted the number of scientific papers 
referenced in each patent, separating references to articles written by one of the 
inventors from references to articles written by others.  Finally, we read the abstract 
and the claims of each of the patents4 in order to determine the precise object of the 
patented invention. We know therefore whether a patent claims the modification of a 
specific trait (e.g. improved nutrition or herbicide resistance) and/or the modification 
                                                 
3 We started by checking all patent titles within the 800 class.  We then ran abstract searches on a large 
combinations of key words such as ‘gene & plant’, ‘gene & specific plant’, ‘transgenic’ and so on.  
Each likely candidate was then read to determine whether or not it belonged in the sample.  In many 
cases, this was the only manner of discriminating between genetic transformation through 
biotechnology and traditional methods of plant husbandry. As a further check we also looked at all of 
the citing patents that we did not already have in our data set. 
4 When necessary, we also referred to the sections ‘background of invention’ and ‘Description of the 
Innovation’. 
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of a specific plant.  We also know whether a patent claims a process and/or a specific 
biological construct (e.g. a gene, a DNA sequence). 
 
Our main goal is to compare the knowledge externalities of university and 
corporate GM crop research.  While looking at patented innovation is in itself of some 
interest, one would hope that the answers obtained on such a sample would also tell us 
something about the overall research of the two types of institutions.  This point is 
illustrated in figure 1. (also found in Trajtenberg at al. (1997)).   
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 The two curves represent the distribution of university and corporation 
innovative activities going from more to less basic (in any sense one wishes).  As 
patents are awarded neither to mere concepts or ideas nor to minute changes in the 
state of the art, there is an intermediate range of innovations that are patentable.  If 
universities do indeed have a distribution of innovations that is weighted more heavily 
towards ‘basicness’ then this bias ought to show within the subset of patentable 
innovations.  If we further assume that there is no university-specific bias in the ypes 
of innovations that are actually patented, then the ‘basicness’ bias should also appear 
within the subset of patented research.   
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2. Knowledge Externalities 
 
In this section we ask whether there is any evidence that GM crop innovations 
patented by universities generate more external benefits than innovations generated by 
other types of agents.  Externalities will be larger the more important the innovation 
and the lower the degree of appropriation of the innovation ‘s benefits by the patent-
holder.  A widely used measure of ‘importance’ is the number of downstream cites 
that a patent generates.  Since later patent applications are, in theory at least, required 
to list all relevant sources of prior art, one would expect that patents that help develop 
significant sub-fields of research will, other things equal, be more widely cited.  
Following Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) we also consider self-citations, 
i.e. cites found in subsequent patents obtained by the same agent, as an indication that 
the innovator is internalising the benefits of his initial innovation.  Our measure of 
external benefits will therefore be the total number of net cites, obtained by 
subtracting own citations from the total number of cites5. This measure is represented 
by the variable CITE. 
 
 We are interested in the following relationship: 
 
TYPEXCITE γβα ++=  
 
, where X is a vector of control variables and TYPE is a vector of dummy variables 
capturing the identity of the agent to whom the patent is assigned. We will include 
four such dummies.  UNIV takes the value 1 if the assignee is a university and 0 
otherwise.  Similarly, GOV identifies a government agency and INDIV indicates that 
the patent-holder is an individual. We also use a MIXED variable that corresponds to 
private corporations that are located in the same town as a university that has a major 
agro-biotech research programme. By default, then patent holders that are not 
identified by any of these four dummy variables are private corporations. 
 
 Given the nature of our data, our dependent variable will be heavily censored.  
This is especially true in this industry where citations appear to be less skewed 
                                                 
5 |Contrary to Trajtenberg et al. (1997) we only include first generation cites.  Over a period of just 11 
years this is unlikely to make much of a difference.  In fact, Trajtenberg et al. themselves find that 
varying the weight placed on second period citations does not significantly affect their results.  
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towards the early years than in other samples.6 To understand the nature of this 
censoring, we must refer to basic principles of Patent Law.  Over the period covered 
by our data, the US still has a ‘first to invent’ system without any disclosure of patent 
applications.  As patent applications are kept secret until the patent is actually 
obtained, the date at which the patent is granted determines when it first becomes 
‘available’ for citation.  Clearly then, the later a patent is granted, the less likely it is 
that it will have gathered a large number of cites.  The number of cites will also 
depend on the status of the patent in terms of ‘prior art’.  In a first to invent system, 
priority is determined by the date of invention.  Although an inventor can, in 
principle, wait for a significant period of time before actually filing a patent 
applications, there are reasons to believe that, in practice, the filing date should be a 
reasonable approximation of the date a which the invention was actually reduced to 
practice. In particular, the Law includes a number of ‘statutory bars’ that would make 
it rather difficult to wait a long time before invention and filing.7 For a given grant 
date, a later filing date means that the patent will become legal precedent for fewer of 
the applications that are still in the process of being approved. In other words, the 
later the file date, the lower the number of expected cites. 
 
 To account for the censoring we will therefore include both the filing date and 
the grant date of a patent as control variables. Defining FILE and GRANT as the 
filing and grant dates measured in months from a common origin, we run a negative 
Binomial regression between CITE and these two dates:  
 
CITE = 6.784*** + 0.00105 FILE – 0.0371*** GRANT 
                                        (0.613)         (0.0069)         (0.008) 
 
,where the marginal effect of  FILE is 0.00359 and the marginal effect of GRANT is –
0.1. The coefficient of GRANT is significantly negative, as expected.  It is also not 
small as a patent granted one year later will on average get one fewer cite.  In a 
sample where the median number of cites is 3, this is not negligible.  The coefficient 
of FILE is not significant.  This, actually, is not surprising because we would expect 
FILE to pick up two effects of opposing sign.  On the one hand, as explained above, 
                                                 
6 See, for example Caballero and Jaffe (1993) 
7 For example, “If an inventor is the first to invent but waits more than a year to apply for a patent 
during which time someone else makes the same discovery and describes, publicly uses, sells or patents 
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an earlier filing date means higher ‘priority’ status and should therefore translate into 
more cites.  On the other hand, more important innovations tend to arise relatively 
early in a given innovation wave.  This would show as a positive correlation between 
CITE and FILE. 
 
 We can now have our first look at university patents.  To do this we keep 
FILE and GRANT as control variables and introduce the full set of assignee dummies 
described above.  As CITE is a non-negative count variable and is often small.  Under 
such conditions, OLS is unlikely to perform well.  In Table 1, we compare OLS to the 
results obtained by using both Poisson and negative binomial regressions.  As our data 
clearly suffers from heteroskedasticity, the numbers presented in brackets are robust 
standard errors. The estimates for the Poisson and negative binomial regressions are 
regression coefficients, not marginal effects.  Their magnitude is therefore not directly 
comparable to the size of the OLS estimates.  
  
Table 1 
 
Dep: CITE OLS (Robust) Poisson (Robust) Negative Binomial 
(Robust) 
Grant -0.158*** 
            (0.329)    
-0.0211*** 
          (0.0575) 
-0.0302*** 
(0.00427) 
File  -0.71+ 
(0.45) 
-0.00611 
(0.00589) 
-0.00464 
(0.00391) 
University 0.394 
(0.96) 
0.0491 
(0.176) 
-0.179+ 
(0.126) 
Mixed 0.443 
(0.889) 
0.0645 
(0.143) 
-0.252** 
(0.116) 
Government -1.181+ 
(0.735) 
-0.55** 
(0.260) 
-0.596*** 
(0.2119) 
Individuals -1.959 
(1.86) 
-0.451 
(0.428) 
-0.506* 
(0.291) 
Constant 38.03*** 
(4.275) 
5.335*** 
(0.309) 
6.6*** 
(0.319) 
 R2 = 0.314 Pseudo R2 = 0.344 Prob > X2 = 0.000 
  g.o.f: p = 0.000 + = nearly significant at 
the 0.1 level 
 
 These results certainly do not support the idea that university patents generate 
more net cites than corporate patents.  In fact, the coefficient of the university dummy 
obtained in the negative binomial regression is negative and almost significant at the 
0.1 level. Interestingly, once appropriate techniques for count data are used, the 
coefficient of the government dummy is quite significantly negative. Table 1 also 
                                                                                                                                            
the invention in this country, the invention is unpatentable by the first inventor, even though he is truly 
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demonstrates that accounting for the discreteness of the dependent variable matters. 
Moreover, as our data show strong signs of over-dispersion, the negative binomial 
approach appears to be more appropriate.  We will therefore limit ourselves to 
reporting the negative binomial estimate for the rest of the paper.8 
 
 In Table 1, we controlled for the dates of filing and grant by using linear 
variables corresponding to the number of months elapsed since a fixed common 
origin.  To allow for non-linearities in the patent citation profile, we also estimated 
equations when FILE and GRANT are replaced by year dummies. The results are 
shown in Table 2. Although the coefficients of the year dummies confirm that the 
relationship between CITE and the dates of filing and grant is not perfectly linear, the 
coefficients of the assignee dummies remain pretty much the same. Government 
agencies, individuals and firms with close links to universities obtain patents that 
generate significantly fewer net cites than corporate patents.  The only novelty is that, 
when year dummies are used to control for both grant and file dates, the coefficient of 
the university dummy is now significantly negative at the 0.1 probability level. 
 
Table 2 
 
Dep: CITE Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Grant -0.0302*** 
(0.00427) 
-0.029*** 
(0.00395) 
  
File  -0.00464 
(0.00391) 
 -0.00847** 
(0.00374) 
 
University -0.179+ 
(0.126) 
-0.162 
(0.123 
-0.168 
(0.1222) 
-0.196* 
(0.1203) 
Mixed -0.252** 
(0.116) 
-0.251** 
(0.1107) 
-0.203* 
(0.1096) 
-0.223** 
(0.1084) 
Government -0.596*** 
(0.2119) 
-0.635*** 
(0.2096) 
-0.591*** 
(0.2249) 
-0.635*** 
(0.2247) 
Individuals -0.596* 
(0.291) 
-0.564** 
(0.2696) 
-0.483* 
(0.2859) 
-0.543** 
(0.2681) 
File Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Grant Dummies   Yes Yes 
Constant 6.6*** 
(0.319) 
4.80*** 
(0.773) 
1.56*** 
(0.525) 
-0.355 
(0.367) 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the one who invented first”, Miller and Davis (1983). 
8 Every reported regression has also been estimated using Poisson.  The results are never markedly 
different. 
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 So far, we have obtained fairly strong evidence that University GM crop 
patents are not associated with larger externalities, as measured by net downstream 
cites.  In the rest of this section, we will test the robustness of this conclusion by 
controlling for factors that might conceivably bias our estimates.   
 
One possible source of bias comes from the nature of the patenting process.  
Effectively, the US PTO ‘s “policy” is just the result of thousands of bilateral 
interactions between applicants and their representative and patent examiners.  
Applicants or, more likely, their legal representatives control the content of the initial 
submission and decide how to respond to the examiner ‘s requests. Examiners have a 
fair amount of discretion as to how the standards of novelty, non-obviousness and 
usefulness apply to specific claims. Clearly then, the two parties have some influence 
on the precise content of the final patent.  This influence might affect the number of 
claims that are finally accepted, the generality of these claims and the extent to which 
the patent acknowledges ‘prior’ art.  The first two factors can significantly affect the 
legal protection granted to a given invention and can, therefore, also influence the 
flow of citations received by the patent.  If each examiner or each firm/legal agent 
only handles a very small proportion of the patents in the data set, we would not 
expect their idiosyncrasies to bias the coefficient of the university dummy.  After all 
there is no reason to believe that universities would systematically choose less 
aggressive IPR lawyers to represent them or that they would systematically be paired 
with tougher PTO examiners.  In our sample however, several Law firms and, 
especially, a few examiners handle a large share of patents.  Just nine law firms 
account for more than 40% of the patents, while the top five examiners account for 
69% of the cases. Since the total number of patents involved is also relatively small, 
one cannot a priori rule out some kind of examiner or attorney-related bias. We have 
therefore estimated equations that include examiners and/or attorney dummies on the 
right-hand side.  We assigned a dummy to each agent involved in at least 10 cases.   
 
As can be seen in Table 3, some of the examiners and attorney dummies are 
highly significant. This supports the hypotheses that the ‘give and take’ involved in 
the patent approval process leaves room individual influences9.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
9 Of course, examiners and attorneys might be narrowly specialised the GM crop area.  In that case, the 
significant coefficients might simply reflect the fact that examiner 8, for example, deals with types of 
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the coefficients of the assignee dummies do not change much.  In particular, the 
university coefficient is still negative and, in some case, significantly so. 
 
Table 3 
 
 Net Cites Net Cites Net Cites 
Constant 6.509*** 6.735*** 6.614*** 
Grant -0.0309*** -0.0311*** -0.0317*** 
File  -0.0049 -0.0043 -0.00485   
University -0.127 -0.222* -0.191+ 
Mixed -0.187+ -0.535*** -0.503*** 
Government -0.513** -0.652*** -0.576*** 
Individuals -0.446+ -0.561* -0.531* 
Exa1 0.202  0.311* 
Exa2 -0.039  -0.013 
Exa3 0.0204  0.051 
Exa4 0.553***  0.577*** 
Exa5 -0.0316  -0.13 
Exa6 -0.432+  -0.341 
Exa7 0.36  0.242 
Exa8 0.56***  0.621*** 
Exa9 -0.0093  0.019 
Exa10 0.0792  0.081 
Atto1  -0.54*** -0.54*** 
Atto2  0.0144 0.087 
Atto3  0.394 0.605* 
Atto4  0.127 0.03 
Atto5  0.725** 0.72** 
Atto6  0.416** 0.51*** 
Atto7  -0.101 0.043 
Atto8  0.336 0.539 
Atto9  0.191 0.333 
Atto10  -1.29*** -1.30*** 
Atto11  -0.349 -0.191 
Atto12  -0.397 -0.282 
Atto13  0.134 0.164 
Atto14  -0.24 -0.182 
Atto15  -0.616*** -0.564** 
Atto16  0.218 -0.276 
Atto17  -0.048 -0.013 
Atto18  0.0264 -0.077 
Atto19  0.273 0.345 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 Although university patents tend to generate fewer ‘externalities’ over the 
whole sample, our results might hide some evolution of the universities ‘ behaviour as 
the new ‘GM’ technological wave evolves. One might for example believe that 
universities disproportionately contribute to the initial ‘basic’ innovations that launch 
                                                                                                                                            
innovations that are more important than, say, examiner 6.  This, however, is not the case.  Examiner 
and attorney dummies remain significant even if one controls quite precisely for the type of innovation 
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a new field but that, as this field evolves, universities turn their attention elsewhere, 
merely taking patents corresponding to fairly routine graduate student ‘ s research.10  
To evaluate this hypothesis, we re-estimated the same relationship as in Table 1, 
breaking the sample into an ‘early’ and a ‘late’ period, based on the filing date. We 
used a variety of dividing dates between January 1992 and January 1996.  In all of 
these regressions the coefficient of the university dummy was not significantly 
different from zero.  The only cases where the coefficient was nearly significant at the 
0.1 level were cases where the coefficient was negative. We must therefore conclude 
that there has not been any period over which university patents were associated with 
greater cite externalities than corporate patents.  
 
 So far, we have implicitly assumed that the distribution of citations over time 
has a similar shape (but not necessarily a similar ‘height’) for all types of assignees. 
However, if university patents were to embody more drastic innovations than 
corporate patents they might initially receive citations more slowly as other inventors 
might need more time to follow in the university ‘s footsteps.  Such a situation is 
shown in figure 2 which represents the distribution of cites overtime for two patents 
granted at the same time.  Although the total lifetime total of cites would be the same 
for both patents, the distribution of cites for the university patent peaks later. Given 
that our citation data is censored at ts, however, we would erroneously conclude that 
university patents give rise to fewer net cites. 
 
In order to test for such a difference between the distributions of cites we 
would need information about the timing of all cites for all patents, something that we 
do not currently have.  What we have, for each patent, is the date of grant of the first 
citing patent. We can therefore compute the citation lag (CILAG) as the difference 
between that date and the date at which the cited patent itself was granted.  The 
citation lag can then be treated as a ‘survival’ time with the first citation of a patent 
spelling the ‘death’ of this observation.  The determinants of such lags are commonly 
estimated by using the censored Weibull regression. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
involved.    
10 For example, isolating a useful gene was once frontier research but it has now become a typical 
subject for an average doctoral Thesis. 
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Figure 2 
 
Right-hand side variables include the assignee dummies and two control 
variables.  The date of grant of the cited variable corrects for the fact that our 
‘survival’ experiments begin at different dates depending on when the cited patent is 
granted.  We also try to control for differences in the lifetime citations that would be 
received by the patents.  If we do not, then a patent with more lifetime citations but 
the same shape of citation distribution would tend to have a shorter lag to its first 
received citations. As a rough control, we run the regressions with the total number of 
net cites on the right-hand side. As explained above, we would expect larger values of 
he cite variable to be associated with shorter citation lags. 
 
 Table 4 presents the results for both the censored Weibull and the censored 
normal regression. The coefficients shown for the Weibull regression are time ratios. 
As expected, later grant dates and higher total number of cites are associated with 
smaller citation lags.  The university dummy has a significantly positive coefficient in 
both regressions, lending support to the hypothesis that university patents might have 
pattern of citation that begins more slowly. The estimated coefficient in the censored 
normal regression suggests that the difference between the distributions amounts to a 
little more than 4 months.  According to the coefficient of the Weibull regression the 
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citation lag for university patents is, on average, 9.4% longer than for corporate 
patents.  As the average citation lag is about 4 years, this amounts to an additional 
delay of about 5 months. 
 
Table 4 
 
Dep: CILAG Censored Normal Censored Weibull 
(Time Ratio) 
Constant 82.089*** 
(5.135) 
 
Grant -0.276*** 
(0.0319) 
0.992*** 
(0.00084) 
Cite -0.595*** 
(0.0728) 
0.984*** 
(0.0156) 
University 4.148** 
(1.677) 
1.094** 
(0.0446) 
Mixed 1.744 
(1.835) 
1.0267 
(0.0456) 
Government 9.26** 
(3.86) 
1.21** 
(0.113) 
Individual -7.29* 
(4.265) 
0.8394* 
(0.0863) 
 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Using CITE to control for the number of lifetime cites is clearly not 
completely satisfactory since whether CITE is a good measure of lifetime cites 
depends itself on the shape of the distributions and therefore on the citation lag.  On 
broad cross-sectional patent data set, the number of claims in a patent has been shown 
to be a useful alternative measure of the importance of a patent.11 As shown in the 
third column of table 4, replacing CITE with the total number of claims does not 
change the size or significance of the university dummy coefficient much. 
 
 
 To evaluate the possible effect of these differences in the pattern of citation we 
modified our data by adding five months to the grant date of university patents.  In 
other words, since university patents appear to suffer an additional lag of five months, 
we treat them as if they had in fact been awarded five months later than they actually 
were. We then re-estimated the relationship between cites, file and grant dates, 
assignee dummies, with and without examiner and attorney dummies.  The results of 
these negative binomial regressions are presented in table 5.  Robust standard errors 
are shown in brackets). 
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 Comparing table 5 to tables 1 and 3, we see that using the ‘handicapped’ grant 
dates does, as expected, increase the coefficient of the university dummy.  Still this 
coefficient is still negative (but not significantly different from zero). The possible 
asymmetry in the shape of the distributions of cites is not enough to reverse our basic 
conclusion. 
 
Table 5 
 
 CITE CITE 
Constant 6.6*** 
(0.318) 
 
6.61*** 
(0.379) 
File -0.0046 
(0.00392) 
-0.0049 
(0.0036) 
Grantcorr -0.0302*** 
(0.00427) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0418) 
University -0.0274 
(0.129) 
-0.0328 
(0.13) 
Mixed -0.252** 
(0.116) 
-0.503*** 
(0.159) 
Government -0.596*** 
(0.211) 
-0.576*** 
(0.212) 
Individuals -0.506* 
(0.291) 
-0.531* 
(0.292) 
Examiner 
Dummies 
 YES 
Attorney 
Dummies 
 YES 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.107 
 
 
 
3. Are University Patents Different from Corporate Patents? 
 
 So far, our results support the claim that, in the GM crop field at least, 
university patented innovation does not generate greater knowledge externalities than 
corporate patents. This seems to suggest that public funding of this type of university 
research might not be justified.  However, such a conclusion might not be warranted. 
In this section we try to determine whether University patents differ in other aspects 
and, if so, whether these difference might justify the subsidisation of University 
research.  
                                                                                                                                            
11 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) 
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 The first hypothesis that we explore is that universities might have specialised 
in different types of innovations within the GM crop field. One possibly important 
distinction is between patents that claim new methods and patents that claim a new 
gene12. To account for this difference, we construct two variables, METHOD and 
GENE.  METHOD is equal to 1 if the patent claims a new method or process and is 
equal to 0 otherwise.  Similarly, GENE is set equal to 1 when new biological entities 
are claimed and is equal to zero otherwise. Since patents can claim several aspects of 
the same innovation, these two categories are not exclusive. 
 
 In our data set, University patents claim ‘Methods’ 55 % of the time and 
‘genes’ 61% of the time.  The corresponding percentages for corporate patents are 
42% and 43% respectively. To the extend that ‘method’ and ‘gene’ claims tend to 
generate different number of net cites than other types of innovations, this might help 
account for the lesser cite counts of university patents.  If, in addition, there were 
reasons to believe that this type of innovation would be less readily supplied by the 
market in spite of their significant social benefits, then one would have a plausible 
case in favour of public funding of university research.  To evaluate this argument, we 
use the two variables as control on the right-hand side of our citation equation. The 
results of the negative binomial regressions are reported in Table 5. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets. 
 
Both control variables are significant but have opposite signs.  These are 
rather intuitive.  ‘Methods’ would tend to have broader applicability than most 
specific genes or DNA sequences.  One would therefore expect the number of cites to 
be larger for ‘methods’ than for ‘genes’. On the other hand, the coefficients of the 
assignee dummies are barely affected by the inclusion of the two new control 
variables so that the argument presented above is not supported. 
 
 
Table 6 
  
 CITE CITE CITE 
Constant 6.44*** 6.68*** 6.55*** 
                                                 
12 This category includes all patents that, in their abstract, claim a gene or another piece of biological 
material such as DNA segments or nucleotides. 
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(0.3105) (0.311) (0.302) 
Method 0.25** 
(0.1054) 
 0.193* 
(0.105) 
Gene  -0.353*** 
(0.0922) 
-0.322*** 
(0.0906) 
Grant -0.0299*** 
(0.00443) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.00436) 
-0.293*** 
(0.00447) 
File -0.0051 
(0.0041) 
-0.0045 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.0041) 
University -0.182 
(0.128) 
-0.182 
(0.132) 
-0.182 
(0.132) 
Mixed -0.290** 
(0.115) 
-0.328*** 
(0.110) 
-0.35*** 
(0.1102) 
Government -0.621*** 
(0.209) 
-0.658*** 
(0.199) 
-0.67*** 
(0.199) 
Individuals -0.413 
(0.308) 
-0.583** 
(0.311) 
-0.506* 
(0.296) 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
 University and corporate research might also differ in the precise areas that 
they target.  Suppose that the proportion of private to social benefits varies across 
these areas.  Private corporations would tend to be more active in the areas with high 
private to social benefits ratios. Absent any public intervention, then, the mix of 
research project would not be socially optimal. For example, Harhoff, Régibeau and 
Rockett (2001) have argued that the faster development of herbicide resistance might 
be explained by the complementarity between the crop and herbicide interests of some 
large corporations.  Under such circumstances, targeting university research towards 
the neglected fields would therefore be a sensible policy. This policy would have two 
interesting implications for the number of citations received by university patents. 
Firstly, to the extent that private GM crop research is more abundant than university 
research, this pattern of specialisation would result in larger number of cites for 
corporate patents than for university patents. This means that, in order to fairly 
compare the level of citation externalities associated with corporate and university 
patents, one should control for the precise area of research. If the argument presented 
has any weight then controlling for fields should increase the value of the coefficient 
of the university dummy. Secondly, if the argument is correct, the origin of citations 
received should differ significantly, with university patents disproportionately cited 
by other universities.  These two predictions are tested below.  
 
 
Table 7 
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 CITE CITE CITE CITE 
Constant 6.78*** 
(0.311) 
6.63*** 
(0.308) 
6.85*** 
(0.306) 
6.72*** 
(0.301) 
File -0.0024 
(0.0039) 
-0.0029 
(0.0041) 
-0.0023 
(0.0040) 
-0.0027 
(0.0041) 
Grant -0.032*** 
(0.00431) 
-0.032*** 
((0.00445) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.00437) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0045) 
Method  0.238** 
(0.098) 
 0.191* 
(0.098) 
Gene   -0.317*** 
(0.091) 
-0.288*** 
(0.0891) 
University -0.145 
(0.119) 
-0.145 
(0.119) 
-0.147 
(0.123) 
-0.144 
(0.122) 
Mixed -0.272** 
(0.112) 
-0.305*** 
(0.111) 
-0.333*** 
(0.108) 
-0.353*** 
(0.107) 
Government -0.585** 
(0.231) 
-0.60*** 
(0.232) 
-0.633*** 
(0.22) 
-0.640*** 
(0.223) 
Individuals -0.605** 
(0.283) 
-0.511* 
(0.300) 
-0.666** 
(0.275) 
-0.586** 
(0.289) 
Herbicide -0.22 
(0.167) 
-0.178 
(0.176) 
-0.15 
(0.172) 
-0.121 
(0.178) 
Pest -0.311* 
(0.165) 
-0.30* 
(0.161) 
-0.293* 
(0.163) 
-0.285* 
(0.160) 
Patho -0.621*** 
(0.141) 
-0.607*** 
(0.141) 
-0.58*** 
(0.139) 
-0.573*** 
(0.140) 
Sugar -0.38** 
(0.191) 
-0.395** 
(0.184) 
0.324* 
(0.198) 
-0.341* 
(0.190) 
Starch 0.405 
(0.268) 
0.448 
(0.300) 
0.478* 
(0.289) 
0.51 
(0.315) 
Fertility -0.657** 
(0.281) 
-0.654** 
(0.270) 
-0.60** 
(0.266) 
-0.602** 
(0.258) 
Nutrition 0.25 
(0.184) 
0.234 
(0.183) 
0.28(0.190) 0.267 
(0.188) 
Growth -1.09*** 
(0.221) 
-1.076*** 
(0.223) 
-1.036*** 
(0.215) 
-1.03*** 
(0.217) 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 In tables 7 through 9, we control for the precise field of research by including 
dummy variables that represent both the specific trait modified and the main plant for 
which the innovation is claimed.  The information required for creating these 
dummies was obtained by reading the claims of every patent in the data set and, if 
further clarification was necessary, by consulting the patent sections on the ‘technical 
background and ‘description’ of the innovation.  It is important to realise that not all 
patents claim the modification of a specific trait and/or of a specific type of plant.  In 
fact patent lawyers often like to state that, when it comes to claims, ‘more is less’.  By 
this they mean that the more specific the claim, the narrower its legal scope.  This 
principle explains why most of the coefficients on patent or trait dummies have 
negative coefficients.  Most of the patents for which the dummies take values of zero 
are patents that do not make trait or plant-specific claims and tend, therefore, to be 
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broader.13 Still, comparing the coefficients of trait and patent dummies pair-wise, one 
can readily see that some significant differences emerge (for example between 
‘growth’ and ‘Pathogen’ or between ‘fertility’ and ‘nutrition’).  It does therefore 
appear that citation rates do vary across sub-fields of research. 
 
 On the other hand, controlling for areas of specialisation does not help bolster 
the coefficient of the university dummy. Comparing with the first column of table 2 
and with table 6, reveals a decrease in both the absolute value and the significance of 
the negative coefficient, but it is very slight. 
 
Table 8 
 
 CITE CITE CITE CITE 
Constant 6.695*** 
(0.3136) 
6.544*** 
(0.3066) 
6,794*** 
(0.303) 
6.674*** 
(0.296) 
File -0.00379 
(0.00385) 
-0.00421 
(0.00404) 
-0.0037 
(0.004) 
-0.0041 
(0.0042) 
Grant -0.032*** 
(0.00417) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.00434) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0311*** 
(0.00444) 
Method  0.279*** 
(0.1005) 
 0.211** 
(0.101) 
Gene   -0.381*** 
(0.091) 
-0.345*** 
(0.090) 
University -0.133 
(0.121) 
-0.151 
(0.118) 
-0.146 
(0.125) 
-0.156 
(0.122) 
Mixed -0.187 
(0.124) 
-0.236* 
(0.123) 
-0.286** 
(0.117) 
-0.313*** 
(0.116) 
Government -0.648*** 
(0.232) 
-0.698*** 
(0.236) 
-0.713*** 
(0.226) 
-0.744*** 
(0.229) 
Individuals -0.497* 
(0.297) 
-0.391 
(0.318) 
-0.593** 
(0.284) 
-0.507* 
(0.30) 
Corn 0.357** 
(0.1504) 
0.341** 
(0.152) 
0.293* 
(0.150) 
0.287* 
(0.152) 
Rice  0.834* 
(0.489) 
0.931* 
(0.523) 
0.868 
(0.544) 
0.943* 
(0.566) 
Soy 0.80*** 
(0.180) 
0.735*** 
(0.169) 
0.914*** 
(0.175) 
0.854*** 
(0.168) 
Wheat -0.699** 
(0.322) 
-0.791** 
(0.330) 
-0.79*** 
(0.308) 
-0.851*** 
(0.316) 
Cotton -0.052 
(0.211) 
-0.0458 
(0.232) 
0.00378 
(0.202) 
-0.0004 
(0.22) 
Potato -0.115 
(0.165) 
-0.178 
(0.169) 
-0.103 
(0.167) 
-0.151 
(0.17) 
Tomato -0.165 
(0.170) 
-0.226 
(0.166) 
-0.171 
(0.154) 
-0.215 
(0.153) 
Tobacco -0.320* 
(0.189) 
-0.318* 
(0.184) 
-0.306 
(0.190) 
-0.302 
(0.188) 
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.101 0.104 0.105 
                                                 
13 Dummies are assigned to the traits and plants that are encountered most often.  Hence a number of 
patents which claim to modify specific, but less frequent, traits or plants are also assigned values of 
zero for all dummies.  
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Table 9 
 CITE CITE 
Constant 6.80*** 
(0.3086) 
6.74*** 
(0.2989) 
File -0.0011 
(0.0038) 
-0.0015 
(0.0042) 
Grant -0.34*** 
(0.00416) 
-0.033*** 
(0.00453) 
Method  0.20** 
(0.0947) 
Gene  -0.326*** 
(0.091) 
University -0.085 
(0.117) 
-0.114 
(0.116) 
Mixed -0.185 
(0.115) 
-0.283*** 
(0.1095) 
Government -0.603*** 
(0.225) 
-0.693*** 
(0.214) 
Individuals -0.55* 
(0.287) 
-0.555* 
(0.292) 
Trait Dummies Yes Yes 
Plant Dummies Yes Yes 
 
 The second implication of the ‘field of specialisation’ story is that universities 
should tend to operate in a ‘world of their own’ and, therefore cite each other ‘s 
patents disproportionately. To test this we regress the proportion of cites received that 
originates from universities.  Both the numerator and the denominator of the variable 
UNIPRO are cites received from third parties.14  For the results presented in Table 10, 
patents that have not yet received any citations were assigned a value of 0 for 
UNIPRO.  Given the resulting mass point at zero, we used a tobit regression. We also 
ran the same regressions restricting the data set to patents that have received at least 
one citation from a third party.  The results were not significantly different.   
 
Table 10 
Tobit 
 
 Unipro Unipro Unipro 
Constant -0.101** 
(0.0413) 
0.702*** 
(0.183) 
0.553*** 
(0.208) 
File  -0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.0019 
(0.002) 
Grant  -0.005** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0041* 
(0.0024) 
                                                 
14 Using total cites in the numerator would introduce a spurious positive correlation between this 
proportion and the university dummy. 
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University 0.111* 
(0.0666) 
0.115* 
(0.674) 
0.143** 
(0.074) 
Mixed 0.015 
(0.0741) 
-0.0028 
(0.075) 
-0.0211 
(0.0947) 
Government 0.382*** 
(0.145) 
0.445*** 
(0.146) 
0.419*** 
(0.147) 
Individuals -0.14 
(0.163) 
-0.198 
(0.168) 
-0.212 
(0.169) 
Exa dummies   Yes 
Atto dummies   Yes 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 The main conclusion from the first two columns of Table 10 is that 
universities do indeed receive proportionally more cites from other universities than 
from the corporate sector compared to what would be expected if citations were 
allocated randomly across these two types of assignees.  Interestingly government 
patents receive an even greater share of their citations from universities than 
universities themselves.  
 
 However, the pattern of citations identified in the first two columns of Table 
10 only establishes that universities have a greater propensity to cite each other.  It 
does not by itself explain where this incestuous pattern of citations comes from.  In 
particular, it does not necessarily imply that it is the result of a common pattern of 
specialisation.  To investigate the issue further, we included our traits and plants 
dummies as control variables.   If the university ‘s tendency to cite each other can be 
mostly explain by the fact that they are disproportionately present in the same 
research areas then controlling for these sub-fields should significantly reduce the 
positive coefficient of the university dummy. Comparing the last two columns of 
Table 10 shows that this is not the case.  Indeed, the coefficient of the university 
dummy is both larger and more significant once areas of research are controlled for. 
 
 Combining the evidence from tables 9 and 10 strongly suggests that the fact 
that university patents receive fewer cites than corporate patents cannot be explained 
by different patterns of specialisation.   Accordingly, it would be hard to argue that 
university research helps correct possible biases in the private sector ‘s choice of GM 
crop applications.  This also means that the positive coefficient of the university 
dummy in the UNIPRO regression must reflect some other mechanism.  One such 
mechanism could be the existence of ‘social networks’ guiding the flow of 
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knowledge, i.e. university inventors might just be more aware of work (included 
patentable inventions) done by other university scientists. 
 
 The results obtained so far are at odds with conventional ideas about 
university research. Even if one accepts that university patents might not on average 
look very different from corporate ones, it is hard to believe that the research 
processes giving rise to these patents are the same. In particular one might think that 
university patents rely more directly on new advances in the underlying science.  To 
evaluate this idea, we follow Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) and create a 
variable that captures the inventors ‘ propensity to cite papers published in scientific. 
This variable, ARTPRO, is the ratio between the number of references to published 
scientific papers and the sum of these references and the number of patents cited. We 
then regress ARTPRO on the assignee type dummies as well as on the grant and file 
dates.  These two dates are included to control for the fact that the pools of citable 
articles and patents might have different relative sizes at different stages of the 
innovation cycle.  For example, relevant patents to cite might be in relatively short 
supply early on.  To the extent that the proportion of university to corporate patents 
vary over time, failure to account for possible time trends in ARTPRO could bias our 
estimates of the coefficient of the university dummy.  As there is a mass point of 
observation for which ARTPRO is equal to zero, we use a tobit regression. We also 
restrict the data set to patents that cite at least one reference, be it patent or article. 
The results are presented in the first column of Table 11. We see that, among all other 
types of assignees, universities are the only ones who rely significantly more on 
scientific articles than private corporations. 
 
We also created a measure of own scientific citations defined as the total 
number of cited papers written by (at least) one of the listed inventors divided by the 
total number of scientific papers cited.  The numerator of this variable was obtained 
by checking the names of the authors of the scientific articles cited against the names 
of the inventors of the patented innovation.  Given that scientific references do not 
always include the full list of authors, our variable must be considered as a rather 
noisy measure of the true ratio.   
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Table 11 (Tobit) 
 
 Artpro 
 
Own Articles Third party 
articles 
 
Constant 4.806* 
(2.751) 
-0.147 
(0.106) 
0.772*** 
(0.070) 
File -0.0276 
(0.0299) 
0.0004 
(0.0011) 
-0.0012 
(0.00077) 
Grant 0.0173 
(0.0339) 
0.00032 
(0.0013) 
0.00047 
(0.00087) 
University 2.325** 
(0.984) 
0.180*** 
(0.0368) 
-.0309 
(0.0254) 
Mixed 0.992 
(1.069) 
-0.018 
(0.0425) 
0.0234 
(0.0277) 
Government -0.216 
(2.334) 
0.124 
(0.0824) 
0.0557 
(0.0574) 
Individuals -3.08 
(2.305) 
0.197** 
(0.0825) 
0.197*** 
(0.0574) 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.0031 
 
By regressing OWNARTPRO against the assignee type dummies, we can get 
an idea of whether university patents rely more on the ‘basic’ scientific knowledge of 
the inventor than patents obtained by other assignees. As shown in the second column 
of table 1, the university dummy is significantly positive. Moreover, if we regress the 
ratio of articles from third parties cited to the total number of citations (patents and 
articles) on assignee dummies and time variables, the coefficient of the university 
dummy becomes negative, albeit not significantly different from zero (see the last 
column of table 11).  Taken together, the results in table 11 suggest that, although 
university inventors are themselves ‘closer’ to the basic science underlying their 
patented innovations they do not rely on the ‘basic’ scientific knowledge of others any 
more than corporate inventors. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 One of the main reasons for subsidising university research is the widespread 
belief that it generates proportionally more positive knowledge externalities than 
corporate research.  Over the last two decades, however, this belief has been shaken 
by the increasingly aggressive patenting of university-based innovation.  This 
perception was supported by Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) who found both 
a sharp increase in university patenting and a decrease in the relative ‘importance’ of 
university innovation over the later part of their 1965-1992 sample.   In this paper, we 
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have compared the knowledge externalities generated by university and corporate 
patents related to GM crop research. Our main measure of knowledge externalities is 
the total number of third party cites generated by a patent. 
 
Using patent data for a well-defined research field has several advantages. 
Firstly, it allows for better control of research area than the three-digit patent classes 
traditionally used in cross-sectional data sets.  Secondly, it makes it easier to identify 
the start of new innovation cycles. As citation patterns might vary along such cycles 
and universities might be more or less involved in different phases, this is potentially 
important. Thirdly, public policy towards university research can be  – and is – 
tailored to specific research areas.  As the government controls the allocation of 
federal funds it can decide whether or not biotechnology, or even GM crops, is a field 
of research that it cares to subsidise at the university level.  It is therefore useful to 
check whether the conclusions drawn from larger data sets are confirmed for more 
narrowly defined domains of innovation. 
 
Our main result is that patented university research is not associated with 
greater knowledge externalities than corresponding corporate patents.  If anything, 
corporate patents appear to generate greater numbers of net citations.  This basic 
conclusion survives when we control for a number of variables that could affect 
citation counts (e.g. patent examiner effects) and when we break our sample into sub-
periods. This does not imply that university patents are similar to corporate patents in 
every respect.  We find two main differences. Firstly, there is some evidence that the 
shape of the distribution of citations is not identical for the two groups of patents as 
university patents appear to experience a more sluggish start than their corporate 
brethren. Secondly, even controlling quite narrowly for areas of specialisation, 
university patents receive a disproportionate number of cites from other university 
patents.  These two results suggest that there are some fundamental differences in the 
types of knowledge flows generated by university and corporate patents. 
Understanding these differences would require not only data on the complete 
distribution of citations, which we do not currently have, and some modelling of the 
knowledge flows.  This is something that we intend to turn too very soon.    
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